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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TOWN AND COUNTRY DISPOSAL, 
Plaintiff-respondent, 
-vs- ) Case No. 14548 
KEN CHRISTOPHER, 
Defendant-appellant. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action by the plaintiff-respondent to obtain 
damages for a breach of contract arising from the purchase of 
sundry equipment and business accounts. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, 
without a jury, and a money judgment in favor of the plaintiff-
respondent, was entered. Judgment was also entered against 
the other co-defendant and contract signatory, J.C. Martin. 
The defendant-appellant, Ken Christopher, filed a motion for a new 
trial, which was denied, and only he has filed an appeal to this 
court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff-respondent, Town and Country Disposal, seeks 
to have the judgment of the lower court affirmed and costs 
awarded to it. 
-1-
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A p p e l l a n t ' s S t a t e m e n t of F a c t s i s t o t a l l y i n a c c u r a t e 
i n many i n s t a n c e s and/ on t h e w h o l e , f a i l s t o v i ew t h e e v i d e n c e 
f a v o r a b l y t o u p h o l d i n g t h e l o w e r c o u r t j u d g m e n t and v e r d i c t . 
The e v i d e n c e , v h e n v i ewed i n a l i g h t mos t f a v o r a b l e t o t h e 
p l a i n t i f f - r e s p o n d e n t , d e m o n s t r a t e s t h e f o l l o w i n g : 
1. The p l a in t i f f - r e sponden t , Town and Country Disposal , 
I n c . , (here inaf te r r e fe r red t o as "Town and Country"), i s a 
closed Utah corporat ion, formerly in the business of garbage 
co l l ec t ion and waste refuge d i sposa l . (Finding of Fact 1, 
R-62; R-80). 
2. Immediately p r io r to September 19 74, the defendant, 
J .C . Martin and Ken Christopher, entered in to discussions and 
negota t ions with Town and Country concerning purchasing ce r t a in 
business accounts, equipment and as se t s r e l a t i n g to the waste 
d isposal bus iness . (R-80-81). The asse t s subject of sa id 
cont rac t included approximately f i f t y C50) Swanson 3-cubic 
yard garbage containers in possession of Town and Country; howe^ 
t i t l e and financing of these containers was in question because 
they had been acquired from Swanson on c r e d i t through an Atlas 
Equipment Company account, by an o f f i ce r of Town and Country whc 
was also an employee of A t l a s . (R-82; R-94; R-172; R-29 8, 300; 
3. Pursuant to sa id negota t ions , a cont rac t of sa le of 
named asse t s was prepared and examined by a l l p a r t i e s . I t was 
knowingly executed a f t e r sa id examination. (R-81; Exhibi t 1; 
Findings of Fact 3, R-62). 
4. The aforesaid contract s p e c i f i c a l l y provided, among 
other t h i n g s , t h a t no ownership i n t e r e s t was asse r ted in Hie 
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50 Swanson containers by plaintiff-respondent, Town and Country. 
Rather, the purchasers, Ken Christopher and J.C. Martin, were 
to arrange independent financing for them. The contract explicitly 
provided: 
"The seller transfers any interest they may 
have in fifty (5) 3-cubic yard Swanson con-
tainers. The seller does not warrant or 
represent that it owns any interest, but 
merely transfers any interest it may have in 
said containers and the locations at which 
they are placed at the time of the execution 
of the within Agreement. It is expressly 
understood between the parties that independent 
financing will be arranged by Purchasers for 
the payment of the indebtedness owed for their 
purchase." (See para. II, Exhibit "A" of the 
January 22, 1975 Agreement, Exhibit I). 
5. In addition to said containers, Town and Country sur-
rendered a 19 74 Chevrolet truck with a 20 yard Leach hydraulic 
container; a 19 74 Ford truck with a 20 cubic yard Leach hydraulic 
container; and business accounts with a gross monthly billings 
of approximately $2,800. (R-82; Exhibit 10). Ttte Purchasers, 
(J.C. Martin and Ken Christopher), were to assume the outstanding 
balance due on the trucks, finance the Swanson containers and 
pay $12,000. at $500. per month for Town and Country's equity 
in the business assets thus sold. CSee Exhibit 1). This 
$12,000. was simply reimbursement for the investment made in the 
business by its Founders. (R-172). 
6. The purchasers, including appellant-Christopher, 
became in serious default of the aforesaid contract. These 
breaches included no payments on the equity; failing to keep 
the Chevrolet truck payment current, having made only one payment; 
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and o ther sundry r e l a t e d d e f a u l t s . Proper and l ega l no t i ce 
of sa id defaul t was served on the purchasers , including 
defendant-appel lant . (Finding of Fact 3 & 4; R-62-64; R-94). 
7. Purchaser, J .C. Martin, was subsequently sued by 
Town and Country and a defau l t judgment obtained. (R-41). Lat 
Mr. Martin obtained counsel and the defaul t was s e t a s ide . (R-5 
Judgment was again entered on h i s ob l iga t ion created under the 
aforesaid cont rac t of September, 19 74, a f t e r t r i a l in the 
above-captioned mat ter ; however, he has not appealed t h a t 
decision and i s not p a r t of the within appe l la te review. (R-66 
8. After receiv ing the aforesaid no t i ce of de fau l t , the 
defendant-appel lant , Ken Christopher , e lec ted to negot ia te a no 
vat ion agreement. Said novation agreement was draf ted by Mr. K 
(counsel for appe l l an t ) , and was executed by Town and Country ij 
the of f ice of Mr. King on or about January 22, 19 75. I t was 
signed agains t the advice of Town and Country's a t torney and 
without i t ' s a t torney being present , with the hopes and expect-
a t ions of rece iv ing some of i t s ' money. (R-101; Exhibi t 4; 
Finding of Fact 6; R-64) . 
9. This novation agreement, in e f f e c t , severed the 
ob l iga t ions under the f i r s t con t rac t between the o r i g i n a l 
Purchasers and gave appel lant -Chr is topher c r ed i t for one-half 
of the down payment made under the f i r s t con t rac t . I t also 
reduced the equi ty ob l iga t ion owed t o Town and Country from 
$12,000 to $6,000 for appel lan t -Chr is topher , and reduced the 
monthly payment ob l iga t ion on h i s pa r t from $500.00 t o $250.00 
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per month. (Exhibit 4; R-101-102; R-140-143; R-200). The 
agreement fur ther provided t h a t appel lant -Chr is topher would 
r e t a i n only the Ford truck and keep the obl iga t ions thereon 
of $736. a month current with Leach Credit Corporation. Also, 
he was to arrange financing for the Swanson con ta ine r s , which 
was not done as provided under the o r ig ina l September 19 74 con t rac t . 
(R-10 2; See, Exhibi t 15; Finding of Fact 4; Statement of Fact 10, 
11, 12, 13 i n f r a ) . 
10. In December of 19 74, the appel lant -Chr is topher i n -
formed the p l a i n t i f f through i t s 1 p r e s iden t , Barry Wickel, t h a t 
he did not have the money t o pay the December Ford truck payment 
to Leach Credi t Corporation in the amount of $736.27. Payment 
was therefore advanced by Mr. Wickel t o prevent a repossession 
of the t ruck , on the promise of p l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l a n t t h a t he 
would pay back the money in January, 19 75. (R-9 3 ) . In January 
19 75, Mr. Wickel picked up a check for t h a t advance, which was 
at tached to a note by appel lant -Chr is topher s t a t i n g : 
"Hold t h i s u n t i l 2-5-75 & I promise the 
payment in f u l l . Thanks. Ken." (Exhibit 8; 
R-9 3) . 
Payment on t h a t check was subsequently stopped; however, r e -
imbursement was made d i r e c t l y to Mr. Wickel in two in s t a l lmen t s : 
(a) February 28, 1975, $300.00 and Cb) March 3, 1975, the 
balance owed on t h a t December truck payment in the amount of 
$436.27 was paid . (R-9 8) . Mr. Wickel 's testimony was c lear 
and ce r t a in tha t these two payments were for the December 1974 
truck payment advance and tha t t h i s fac t was acknowledged by 
appel lant -Chr is topher in a March 3, 1975 meeting. (R-93-9 8) . 
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Appellant-Christopher denied at trial that the payments thus 
made were for the December truck payments; however, he had no 
understandable explanation as to why all the other truck 
payments were made directly to Leach Credit Corporation, 
why these two payments were paid directly to Mr. Wickel, 
less than a week apart, or why they exactly totaled the amount 
of the truck payment advanced by Mr, Wickel, to the penny. 
(See Testimony of Mr. Christopher, R-202-203; R-206-207). 
11. As early as December 1974, Appellant-Christopher 
had participated in discussions with the Atlas Equipment Compar 
to arrange financing for the Swanson 3-cubic yard garbage con-
tainers. (R-183-185). In January, 1975, prior to the novation 
agreement execution, additional meetings were held with Atlas 
and others, including appellant-Christopher. At these meetings 
financing of the containers was discussed. (R-184). Subsequen 
financial arrangements were preliminarily negotiated with I.D.S 
Leasing Company, and called for appellant-Christopher to make 
the monthly installments. Under the arrangement, I.D.S. was to 
acquire title from Swanson by paying for the containers and 
appellant-Christopher was to pay I.D.S. on a lease-purchase 
agreement, whereunder, Atlas Equipment Company was a co-leasee. 
(R-l85-187). However, this leasing contract required liability 
insurance, which was to be provided by appellant-Christopher. 
Appellant-Christopher specifically agreed to obtain that insura 
and provide evidence of it to I.D.S. Leasing in order to comple 
the transaction. (R-187; Exhibit 13, 24, 29; See also, Stateme 
of Facts 12, 13 and 14, infra). 
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12. On January 22, 19 75, the parties including appellant-
Christopher met in the office of his attorney, Mr. King, and 
executed the January, 19 75 novation agreement. The figures 
provided by the I.D.S. Leasing Corporation, were used to 
establish the lease rental monthly obligation of $396.14; 
however, it was understood that appellant-Christopher still 
had to provide evidence of insurance to I.D.S. before I.D.S. 
would execute the lease-purchase agreement and clear title to 
the Swanson containers. (R-188-189; R-298-300). The undisputed 
testimony of Mr. James Duram and others was that at the January 
22, 19 75 meeting, where the novation agreement was executed, this 
insurance and lease agreement werediscussed. Prior to contract 
execution, all parties knew the I.D.S. lease-purchase contract 
had not been executed. Also, appellant-Christopher agreed to 
provide that insurance. The record shows as follows: 
"Q. (Cutler) was insurance and the obligation of 
Mr. Christopher to provide insurance so that I.D.S. 
Leasing financing could be arranged, discussed?" 
"A. (Mr. Duram) It was discussed. And Kent 
Christopher said he would take care of it, yes, 
sir." (R-188) (Emphasis added); See also R-189. 
13. Appellant-Christopher failed to perform and provide 
the certificate of insurance and the lease was never consummated. 
(R-161-164; R-169; R-185-188; Exhibits 13, 24 and 29). 
14. The appellant-Christopher, tendered two checks made 
payable jointly to Atlas Equipment, Barry Wickel and I.D.S., one 
on January 22, 19 75 in the sum of $397, and one on March 3, 1975 
in the sum of $396.99. Eowever, both checks were the subject of 
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a stop payment order by appellant/ and the funds were never 
applied on any I.D.S. lease account, and those funds were 
never received or used by Town & Country. (Exhibit 13; R-92; 
R-209-211). 
15. Appellant-Christopher became in default under the 
novation agreement dated January 22, 19 75. Specifically, he 
failed: (a) To keep current the $250. monthly equity payment 
obligation. No payment was made in February 19 75 or any month 
thereafter. (Exhibit 5; R-103-104; R-174; R-209; R-215); 
(b) The defendant drove the truck without safety inspection 
and on expired license plates contrary to the truck retail 
sales contract he assumed; (See para. 17 of Exhibit 3; R-170); 
(c) Failed to obtain I.D.S. financing of the Swanson containers 
by failing to honor his commitment to provide liability insuran« 
to I.D.S. Leasing. (Finding of Fact 7, R-63; See also Statemeni 
of Fact 10, 11 and 12, supra). 
16. Respondent, Town and Country, fulfilled every term 
and condition on its part to be performed under the original 
contract of September 19 74, and under the novation agreement 
dated January 22, 1975. (Finding of Fact 7, R-63). 
17. The novation contract of January 22, 19 75 required 
10 days prior notice of default and election to repossess; howe^ 
it did not require that the notice be in writing. (See, para. 
VIII of Exhibit 4). 
18. Respondent, Town and Country, was notified that 
appellant-Christopher was delinquent in keeping the Ford truck 
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payment current and t h r ea t s of repossession were made by Mr. Regents 
of Leach Credi t Corporation in Wisconsin. (R-105). 
19. Town and Country prepared and mailed a wr i t t en no t i ce 
of defau l t and i n t en t to repossess to the appel lant -Chr is topher 
on February 25, 1975. (Exhibit 9; R-105; R-306-307, 311). Also, 
p r i o r t o February 25, 19 75, appel lant -Chr is topher was given many 
o r a l no t ices of h i s defaul ts and the i n t e n t to repossess , i f 
those were not cured by him. (R-105; R-30 3-30 4; R-2 79; Finding 
of Fact 8, R-64) . 
20. Appellant-Christopher f a i l ed to remedy h i s defaul t and 
Town and Country ef fectuated a peaceful repossession of the Ford 
t ruck on March 7, 19 75, a date more than 10 days a f t e r the no t ice 
of defau l t was received by appel lan t -Chr is topher . CR-106; R-107; 
Finding of Fact 9, R-6 4) . 
21 . Town and Country paid the March and Apri l payment 
on the aforesaid t ruck and f i na l l y sold i t for the balance due 
t o Leach Credi t Corp. (R-10 8; Exhibi t 15). However, Town and 
Country a lso had to pay for r epa i r s on the truck p r i o r to sa id 
s a l e t o t a l i n g $278. (R-109) 
22. Appellant-Christopher vo lun ta r i l y re turned 42 of the 
Swanson containers sometime a f t e r the Ford t ruck was repossessed 
on March 7, 19 75, but they were returned damaged and f u l l of 
garbage. (R-106, 171; R-211). Subsequently, a l l of the o ther 
containers were a lso peacefully recovered by respondent, Town 
and Country. (Finding of Fact 10, R-64). However, the business 
accounts and customers were never returned t o Town and Country. 
(R-113; R-140-142). Appellant has survived and continues t o 
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operate a co l l ec t ion bus iness , but using o ther equipment. 
(R-273, 290) . 
23. The lower court determined the damages to be the 
unpaid equity under the cont rac t and awarded judgment in the 
sum of $4,750. , toge ther with pre-judgment i n t e r e s t and c o s t s . 
(R-66). No a t t o r n e y ' s fees were awarded. Also f no award was 
given for the i nc iden t a l costs and damages incurred by Town 
& Country for damage to the trucks repossessed, emptying the 
garbage, or o ther i nc iden ta l expenses. (R-66). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
VIEWING THE FACTS, IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO 
THE PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, TOWN AND COUNTRY DISPOSAL, I N C . , 
THE RECORD DEMONSTRATES THAT THE APPELLANT-CHRISTOPHER WAS 
IN DEFAULT UNDER THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE NOVATION 
AGREEMENT OF JANUARY 2 2 , 1 9 7 5 , LEGAL AND PROPER NOTICE OF 
DEFAULT WAS GIVEN PURSUANT TO THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT 
EXISTING BETWEEN THE PARTIES, AND THE REPOSSESSION WAS 
LEGAL AND PROPER IN ALL REGARDS. 
The law i n U t a h , c o n c e r n i n g a p p e a l s of c o n t e s t e d i s s u e s 
o f F a c t , i s s o c l e a r as t o h a r d l y r e q u i r e r e c i t a t i o n : F a c t s 
found by t h e l o w e r c o u r t w i l l b e v i ewed i n a l i g h t mos t f a v o r a b : 
t o t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t i e s ; f u r t h e r , j u d g m e n t s w i l l b e s u s t a i n e d 
i f s u p p o r t e d by any s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e and r e a s o n a b l e i n f e r e n c 
t o be drawn t h e r e f r o m . J e n s e n v . Eddy, 30 Ut . 2d 1 5 4 , 514 P . 2 d 
I n t h e c a s e b e f o r e t h e b a r , a p p e l l a n t ' s a r g u m e n t seems s i n 
t o be a q u a r r e l w i t h t h e J u d g e ' s f i n d i n g on d i s p u t e d t e s t i m o n y , 
t h a t two paymen t s t o t a l i n g $736 .2 7 c o n s t i t u e d r e p a y m e n t of a 
December 19 74 t r u c k paymen t advance by Mr. W i c k e l ; t h e y w e r e nc 
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payments t o be c red i ted on the January 19 75 novation agreement. 
Even appe l l an t -Chr i s topher ' s own accounting supports t h i s 
ru l ing and shows t h a t there was only one payment in January on 
the $250. equity ob l iga t ion . (Exhibit 5; Statement of Fact 12) . 
Fur ther , the two payments t o t a l i n g $736.27 made on February 27 
and March 3, were admittedly not even paid to Town and Country; 
r a t h e r , they were checks made payable to Mr. Wickel pe rsona l ly . 
(See Exhibi t 5 ) . Also, the only other payments made, which 
could be construed as applying on t h i s equity payment, are two 
checks, tendered as payment on the 50 Swanson con ta ine r s . 
However, both of these checks were the subject of "stop payment 
orders" d i rec ted by the appel lan t -Chr is topher . (See Statement 
of Fact 12). 
Thus, p l a i n t i f f s ' own exh ib i t s and testimony demonstrate 
t ha t he was in de fau l t under the terms and condit ions of the 
contrac t as of February 6, 19 75, the date the equity payment 
was due. (See para . IV of the January 22, novation agreement, 
p l a i n t i f f ' s Exhibi t 4; See a l s o , Statement of Fact 12). 
Mr. King t a c i t l y admitted t h i s fac t under examination by 
the cour t , which re jec ted the accounting he has again, in t h i s 
appeal , t r i e d to p resen t . In responding t o a p p e l l a n t ' s argument, 
the following colloque occured: 
"The Court: Why wasn ' t he in defaul t on the $250 
on the mat ter , for the 250 which he had contracted 
t o pay?" 
"Mr. King: Well, the only payments they made o ther 
than the payments on the truck and the equipment was 
(sic) the payments made on the 3rd of March, $300 
and $436." 
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"The Court; Well, t ha t wasn f t the $250." 
"Mr. King; No. I t wasn ' t the $250." 
"The Court; A l l r i g h t , your motion i s denied." (R-215). 
This defaul t was one in a long h i s to ry dating back to 
September 19 74, and when viewed in i t s h i s t o r i c a l context , one 
may understand respondent ' s concern. In September 1974, a 
valuable business operat ion and asse t s had been t ransfe red t o 
the custody of J . C. Martin and Ken Chris topher . Town and 
Country had received $2,500. downpayment and one $500 equi ty 
payment at t h a t time on a $12,000 o b l i g a t i o n . However, sub-
sequent to September, 19 74, the two purchasers were continuous1; 
in defau l t and respondent was having i t s c r e d i t damaged because 
purchasers f a i l ed t o keep current two truck payments they assum< 
Fur ther , subsequent to September, 19 74, Mr. Martin and Mr 
Christopher had ceased operat ing the business as a pa r tne r sh ip 
and had divided the asse ts and accounts between themselves. In 
t h e i r new mode of doing bus iness , many accounts were l o s t by 
Mr. Mart in ' s r a i s i ng pr ices as much as 300 percent . CR-239-240) 
In addi t ion they had changed the method of doing bus iness , and 
q u i t using the two trucks in conjunction, one for wet garbage 
pick-up and one for cardboard. Rather, each purchaser separa te] 
operated routes and mixed wet garbage with the cardboard. This 
change of business operat ion r e su l t ed in a loss of approximately 
$1,000 per month in income, because they could no longer s e l l 
the cardboard t o a reclamation firm in i t s contaminated condi t i 
(R-239; R-245-247} . Mr. Martin subsequently abandoned h i s ha l f 
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the accounts and the Chevrolet truck, with its $800 per month 
obligation, was left for the respondent to worry about. This 
truck was repossessed in November, 1974. (R-110, 144; Exhibit 11; 
Statement of Fact 20}. 
Because of the apparent destruction of the financial core 
of the business, the loss of accounts, and the remaining liability 
on the equipment in the possession of appellant-Christopher, 
Town and Country, was contacting the appellant-Christopher for 
its money, virtually every week. (See Statement of appellant-
Christopher's wife, R-278-280). In fact, it was solely a 
desperate attempt to salvage, what appeared to be a dangerously 
precarious financial position, which prompted Town and Country 
to sign the novation agreement of January 22, 19 75, against the 
advice of its own counsel. [Statement of Fact 8}. 
Therefore, when appellant-Christopher became delinquent 
again in February, 19 75, only one month after signing a novation 
contract, Town and Country attempted collection and then formally 
served notice of default under the contract, both orally and in 
writing. This notice clause of the contract, prepared by appellant-
Christopher's attorney, reads as follows: 
"In the event of default by purchaser of any 
installment of the purchase priced m at the 
time the payments to come due are payable, 
Seller shall have the right and option of de-
claring the contract in default and may elect, 
if it sees fit, to repossess all of the equipment 
covered by the agreement and continue the operation 
of the disposal business as in its first and for-
mer state. Notice of said election to repossess 
shall be given to Purchaser no less than ten CIO) 
days prior to the date when Seller intends to 
repossess." (See para. VIII of the January 22, 
19 75 agreement marked as Exhibit 4). (Emphasis added). 
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The trial testimony concerning the notice given was 
contested; however, the court adopted and believed the testimon 
of the respondent. It specifically found: 
"The plaintiff (Town and Country Disposal) served 
written notice of default on defendant-Christopher 
on February 25, 19 75, and prior thereto plaintiff 
gave oral notice of said default and made demand 
of defendant to cure said default." 
"The defendant, Ken Christopher, failed to correct 
the default within 10 days and the plaintiff duly 
repossessed the subject motor vehicle on or about 
March 7, 1975." (Findings of Facts 8 and 9, R-64; 
See also, Statement of Fact 17, supra). 
As previously noted, appellant1s argument appears to be 
a quarrel with the court in finding facts, on disputed evidence, 
against his clients. He argues on page 7 of appellant's brief, 
that the $300. payment of February 28, 1975, and the one of 
$436.27, in March, (which interestingly totals the exact amount 
of the Ford truck payment of $736,27), should be credited, 
somehow, on the February 19 75 equity payment of $250. However, 
Mr. Wickel clearly testified that these two payments were to pay 
off a truck advance payment made in December, 19 75, and for 
which appellant-Christopher had signed a note to re-pay. CSee 
Statement of Fact 8). 
The lower court properly found appellant in default and 
it is not productive for appellant-Christopher to now quarrel wi 
the findings of the lower court, where credible evidence exists 
to support that finding. 
It is respectfully submitted that findings of the lower 
court are supported, not only by credible evidence, but by 
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compelling evidence. I t shows that appellant-Christopher was 
indeed in default in his payments and that timely and proper 
notice was duly given. Of course, these defaults do not even 
consider the fact that he was driving without a safety in-
spection and on expired p la tes , contrary to other contract 
provisions which appellant-Christopher had agreed to perform. 
I t i s , therefore, respectfully submitted tha t the findings 
of the lower court should not be disturbed and that i t s ' 
decision should be affirmed. 
POINT I I 
THE DOCTRINE OF "IMPOSSIBILITY" OR "FRUSTRATION" OF 
CONTRACTS IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
There exist no facts recalled by the writer and none he 
can discover in the transcript which demonstrate any "frustration" 
of Mr. Christopher in the use of the 50 Swanson containers. 
Rather, the record demonstrates that appellant used them free 
of charge from September 1974, "until he voluntarily returned 
42 of them in March, 19 75, after Town and Country repossessed 
the Ford truck because of his breach. This free use was had 
despite written and oral contractural commitments to finance 
them independently. (See Statement of Fact 4, 8, 20). 
The record is also clear that appellant-Christopher 
knew that the 50 Swanson containers had been originally acquired 
by Mr. Duram on the credit and open account of Atlas Equipment 
Company for Town and Country. As early as September 19 74, he 
signed a contract agreeing to take the containers/under a document 
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in the nature of a q u i t claim deed, and to arrange h i s own 
f inancing. (See contrac t language and references a t Statement 
of Fact 4 ) . There i s no evidence to suggest tha t the conta iner 
did not e x i s t ; r a t h e r , qu i te the contrary i s t r u e . The contain* 
did e x i s t , were never destroyed and were used by appe l l an t -
Chris topher . Therefore, what relevance case law concerning 
"non-exis tent" proper ty , or property destroyed "without f a u l t o 
e i t h e r par ty" has to these f a c t s , escapes t h i s w r i t e r . 
In add i t ion , i t must be noted t h a t appel lant has c i t ed no 
testimony or evidence of record to support any asse r t ion t h a t 
f inancing through I .D.S . was impossible or f ru s t r a t ed in any 
way. On the contrary , the record i s c l ea r t h a t the financing 
was a l l arranged as of January 22, 19 75, apparently to solve 
appe l l an t -Chr i s topher ' s own breach of the 19 74 agreement to 
arrange h i s own f inancing. Thereaf ter , the financing awaited 
only the act of appel lant -Chr is topher in honoring h i s promise 
to supply I .D .S . Leasing Company with l i a b i l i t y insurance . 
(See Statements of Fact 9, 10, 11 , 12 and 13). 
Thus, not only was there no " f r u s t r a t i o n " and no 
" imposs ib i l i ty" of performance, but appel lant -Chr is topher was 
"at f a u l t . " Evan i f a p p e l l a n t ' s au thor i ty was r e l evan t , i t 
does not help t h i s case . Fur ther , the cases c i t ed by appel lant 
c e r t a in ly cannot be read to permit a defaul t ing par ty to object 
to a va l id repossess ion, a f t e r no t i ce was given pursuant to the 
terms of a cont rac t h i s own at torney draf ted . The w r i t e r has 
found no au thor i ty to support a p p e l l a n t ' s underlying argument th 
the l ega l repossession of income producing equipment cons t i t u t e s 
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a "frustration" or "impossibility" of payment performance, 
barring court awarded damages for contract breach. Certainly, 
appellant's authorities do not stand for that proposition. 
It is respectfully submitted that on the facts of this 
case which demonstrate that the security was lawfully and 
properly repossessed, including the 50 Swanson containers 
which were voluntarily returned by appellant-Christopher; 
the doctrine of "frustration" or "impossibility" of contract 
performance is totally inapplicable. In addition, the facts 
amply demonstrate that appellant-Christopher was fully aware 
of his obligation to provide liability insurance and arrange 
financing on the 50 Swanson containers. There is no pleading 
to suggest fraudulent or material misrepresentation concerning 
the containers, and no such issue was proved at trial. 
Therefore, the decision of the lower court should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The record in this case conclusively demonstrates that 
the appellant-Christopher was in default under the January 22, 
1975 novation contract, among^relevanqfe regards, in that he 
failed to make the February 19 74 equity payment of $250. Due 
and legal notice^pursuant to the terms of the agreement^was 
given. However, said appellant failed to correct the default 
within 10 days and the equipment was repossessed peacefully, 
pursuant to the agreement between the parties. Other sundry 
equipment was voluntarily surrendered. 
The findings of the lower court are supported by sub-
stantial evidence and appellant-Christopher has presented no 
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f a c t u a l o r l e g a l b a s i s on which t h e d e c i s i o n of the lower 
cou r t should be o v e r t u r n e d . Thus, t h i s cou r t shou ld a f f i rm 
the lower c o u r t d e c i s i o n and award c o s t s t o r e s p o n d e n t -
Town and Country . 
R e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t t e d , 
ROGER F . CUTLER 
At torney fo r p l a i n t i f f - r e s p o n d e 
Town and Country D i s p o s a l , I n c . 
602 Eas t Thi rd South 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84102 
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